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PUNITIVE DAMAGES-ADDRESSING THE CONSTITJTI'ONALITY OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Dunn v. HOVIC (1993)
I. INTRODUCION
United States courts first awarded punitive damages in Genay v. Norris'
in 1784.2 Today, courts frequently award punitive damages.3 The fre-
quency and magnitude4 of punitive damages awards raise particular con-
1. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6, 6 (1784). In Genay, the South Carolina Supreme Court
awarded "vindictive damages" against the defendant physician. Id. The plaintiff
and the defendant, who were both intoxicated, prepared to settle a quarrel with
pistols. Id. Before the altercation, the defendant proposed a reconciliation toast..
I. Nonetheless, in order to harm the plaintiff, the defendant secretly spiked
plaintiff's wine glass. Id. at 7.
2. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1290 (1993); see also
James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived
Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1117, 1119 (1984) (noting that statutory remedy of
multiple awards providing for awards in excess of actual damages existed in Hindu
Code of Manu and Code of Hammurabi).
For a detailed discussion of the history of punitive damages, see Rustad &
Koenig, supra, at 1284-1304.
3. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILIY
FOR PERSONAL INJURY, vol. II, at 232 (Paul C. Weiler ed., 1991) [hereinafter ENTER-
PRISE RESPONSIBILrry]. The increased frequency of punitive damages awards is il-
lustrated in a 1986 Rand Corporation study that surveyed punitive damages during
the period between 1960-1984 in San Francisco County, California and Cook
County, Illinois. Id. at 233-34 (citing M. PETERSON ET AL., PUNrrVE DAMAGES: EM-
PIRICAL FINDINGS (1987)). The study found a marked increase in the levying of
punitive damages awards. Id.
In addition, courts may award punitive damages awards in cases involving a
wide array of products. See, e.g., Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 830 (3d
Cir. 1983) (motorcycles); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir.
1981) (automobiles), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 358 (Ct. App. 1981) (automobiles); Toole v. Richardson-
Merrell Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 403 (Ct. App. 1967) (MER/29-a high cholesterol
drug); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 195 (Colo. 1984) (Dalkon Shield
intrauterine device [IUD]). Compare Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the
Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 53-63 (1982) (describing rapid expan-
sion of number and size of punitive damages awards) with Rustad & Koenig, supra
note 2, at 1328-33 (maintaining continued value of unrestricted punitive damages
awards).
4. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711,
2711 (1993) ($10 million punitive damage award in slander of tide action); Glass-
cock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d 1085, 1088 (5th Cir. 1991) ($6.1 million
punitive damages award in asbestos case), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1778 (1992);
O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1440 (10th Cir. 1987) ($10
million award in toxic shock syndrome case), cert. denieA, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988);
Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1567-68 (6th Cir. 1985) ($1.5
(1105)
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cerns in mass tort cases, where the potential for unlimited liability arises.5
The increased frequency of punitive damages awards in mass tort cases
raises numerous arguments concerning the constitutionality of such
awards.
6
million in asbestos case), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986); Palmer, 684 P.2d at 198
($6.2 million award in Dalkon Shield IUD case); Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358
($3.5 million award in automobile case).
5. Alan Schulkin, Note, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1797, 1797 (1979); see also L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LL2uIL
rrv § 33.01(7), at 302 (1978) ("[The specter] of punitive damages is particularly
disturbing to the manufacturer who distributes his product to thousands and
sometimes millions of users.").
Mass tort cases involve multiple actions against a single defendant that arise
out of a single manufactured product such as asbestos, or a single accident such as
a large fire. Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing
the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control. 52 FoIRDHAM L. Rv. 37, 37-40 (1983).
The potential for widespread design defect liability is evident in the following
examples of mass tort cases. The number of claims filed in actions involving the
Dalkon Shield IUD and Agent Orange exceeded 250,000. ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBIL-
rry, supra note 3, at 385-86. The number of asbestos claims is also rapidly ap-
proaching this number. Id. A pproximately 1,500 suits were filed by plaintiffs who
suffered injuries as a result of their use of the drug MER/29, and hundreds of
other claims were settled. Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story - An Instance of
Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 116, 121 (1968). In addition,
plaintiffs have filed over 1,000 claims alleging injuries resulting from the drug di-
ethylstilbestrol (DES). ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILTY, supra note 3, at 386. In Moseley
v. General Motors Corp., a Georgia state court awarded compensatory damages of
$4.24 million and punitive damages of $101 million in a products liability case
which involved the design of a General Motors pickup truck. Bryan Gruley, GM
Plays a High-Stakes Game of Recall Roulette, THE DETROrr NEWS, Apr. 10, 1993, at 3.
The number of additional lawsuits that could follow this substantial award is seem-
ingly unlimited, given that 4.7 million trucks containing the alleged defective de-
sign were sold between 1973 and 1987. Id.
6. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2918-24 (holding $10 million punitive damages award
did not violate Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment of United States
Constitution); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 7-19 (1991) (same);
see also Thomas R. Newman & StevenJ. AhmutyJr., Review of Punitive Damages, N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 1, 1993, at 3 (discussing Haslip and TXO).
Public policy concerns regarding an award of punitive damages also exist.
LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.1(c), at 23 (2d
ed. 1989). For example, a court will award punitive damages when such damages
serve the best "interest of society and [it is] for the public benefit" to punish and
deter the defendant's conduct. Id. For a further discussion of various criticisms of
punitive damages awards, see SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra, § 2.2, at 26-28, 30-31.
Some commentators have advanced constitutional arguments against the im-
position of punitive damages. See generally Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due
Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L. REv. 975, 977 (1989) (questioning fairness and effi-
ciency of punitive damages); John C. Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality
of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REv. 139 (1989) (discussing constitutional argument
that inadequate procedural protections against unjustified or erroneous punitive
damages awards exist); Theodore B. Olson & Theodore J. Boustrous, Jr., Constitu-
tional Restraints on the Doctrine of Punitive Damages, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 907 (1990) (dis-
cussing United States Supreme Court's examination of Excessive Fines Clause of
Eighth Amendment).
1106 [Vol. 39: p. 1105
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently ad-
dressed the constitutionality of punitive damages awards in Dunn v.
HOVIC.7 In Dunn, an asbestos case, the defendant challenged the consti-
tutionality of a punitive damages award assessed by the lower court. 8 The
Third Circuit concluded that multiple punitive damages awards against a
single defendant do not violate the constitutional requirements of due
process.9
This Casebrief examines the constitutionality of punitive damages
awards, focusing on multiple awards against a single defendant. Part H
discusses punitive damages awards generally and considers some of the
more serious problems presented by such awards.10 Part III addresses the
constitutional arguments for and against imposing punitive damages
awards." Part IV highlights the positions taken on this issue by numerous
circuit courts. 12 Part V analyzes the Third Circuit's view in Dunn v. HOVIC
regarding the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.' 3 Finally, this
Casebrief concludes in Part VI with a look at the future of punitive dam-
ages awards in the Third Circuit. 14
II. PUNITivE DAMAGES AwARDs GENERALLY
Ajury may award punitive damages to punish a defendant for certain
conduct and to deter similar undesirable acts in the future.' 5 In order to
7. 1 F.3d 1371, 1379-81 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993). For a
thorough discussion of the Third Circuit's reasoning in Dunn, see infra notes 145-
72 and accompanying text.
8. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1373-74. Ajury awarded the plaintiff $25 million in puni-
tive damages. However, the trial court judge remitted this amount to $2 million.
Id. at 1373, 1383. The Third Circuit further remitted the award to $1 million. Id.
at 1373.
9. Id. at 1379. For a further discussion of the court's reasoning in Dunn, see
infra notes 145-90 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of punitive damages, see infra notes 15-28 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of various concerns associated with punitive damages
awards, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the basis for constitutional arguments for and against
punitive damages, see infra notes 29-99 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the positions taken by selected circuit courts, see infra
notes 100-44 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's view on the constitutionality of mul-
tiple punitive damages awards, see infra notes 145-90 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the future of multiple punitive damages awards, see
infra notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977). Comment a of the
Restatement states that "[t]he purposes of awarding punitive damages... are to
punish the person doing the wrongful act and to discourage him [or her] and
others from similar conduct in the future." Id. § 908 cmt. a; see also BLACK'S LAW
DicrIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that punitive damages are awarded to
"punish the defendant for . .. evil behavior [and to] make an example of [the
defendant]").
The purposes of punitive damages have been discussed at length by numerous
authors. See, e.g., Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 103 (6th Cir. 1975)
3
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recover a punitive damages award, a plaintiff must show the defendant's
conduct was outrageous, willful, wanton, malicious, conscious or in reck-
less disregard for the rights or safety of others.16
The traditional common-law approach of assessing punitive damages
awards involves several stages.17 Initially, a trial judge must find sufficient
evidence concerning a defendant's conduct to justify the imposition of a
punitive damages award.' 8 Once a trial courtjudge makes this determina-
tion, ajury may assess punitive damages in any amount it deems appropri-
ate from the defendant's conduct. The jury bases its assessment on the
gravity of the defendant's wrong, the need to deter similar wrongful con-
(identifying purpose of punitive damages as punishment for intentional, reckless,
wanton or willful conduct), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); SCHLUETER & REDDEN,
supra note 6, § 2.2 (noting that purpose of punitive damages is generally nonremu-
nerative); Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Dam-
ages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1, 38-92 (1985) (discussing social
functions of punitive damages); Thomas C. Galligan, Augmented Awards: The Effi-
dent Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REv. 3, 17 (1990) (discussing deter-
rence as factor determining future behavior); David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing
Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 7-10
(1982) (noting that purpose of punitive damages is to punish defendant who
"commits an aggravated or outrageous act of misconduct against the plaintiff" and
to deter similar behavior in future); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1304-28
(noting change in purpose of punitive damages from malicious and mean-spirited
conduct to deterring careless actions); Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Pu-
nitive Damages Reform-State Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Haslip, 42 AM. U. L. Rv. 1365, 1368-69
(1993) (discussing confusion regarding purpose of punitive damages); Seltzer,
supra note 5, at 43 (noting that punitive damages awards are not really damages
but rather are "quasi-criminal" sanctions imposed to punish and deter defendants'
offensive conduct).
Punitive damages are also known as exemplary damages. SCHLUETER & RED-
DEN, supra note 6, § 2, at 20. Treble damages, which are similar to punitive dam-
ages, are statutorily awarded damages that are three times the amount of actual
damages. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 393 (6th ed. 1990). For purposes of this
Casebrief, these damages will be referred to exclusively as punitive damages.
16. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 658 (5th Cir. 1981)
(punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that involves "wantonness or reck-
lessness or reckless indifference to the rights of others"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880
(1982); Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 172 Cal. Rptr. 59, 62 (Ct. App. 1981)
("[P]unitive damages can be awarded for conscious disregard of the safety of
others."); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that standard of conduct for punitive damages awards is "complete indif-
ference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others"); see also RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977) ("Punitive damages may be awarded for con-
duct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indif-
ference to the rights of others.").
For a further discussion of the proscribed conduct necessary for an award of
punitive damages, see ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILrrY, supra note 3, at 243-48.
17. For a discussion of the common-law method of assessing punitive dam-
ages, see infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
18. Seltzer, supra note 5, at 46-47 (citing K. REDDEN, PUNrrIVE DAMAGES § 3.4,
at 56 (1980)). For a discussion of the conduct necessary to justify an award of
punitive damages, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
1108 [Vol. 39: p. 1105
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duct, and the wealth of the defendant.19 After the jury renders its deci-
sion, the trial court judge and appellate courts review the award to ensure
its reasonableness. 20 In examining these awards, however, the courts have
traditionally afforded juries a great deal of discretion.2 1
Commentators and courts raise several arguments against the imposi-
tion of punitive damages awards, especially in mass tort cases.22 First,
many commentators assert that punitive damages should not be awarded
at all, because the compensatory award has already sufficiently compen-
sated the plaintiff.23 Futher, the dual objectives of punitive damages
awards are adequately served in mass tort cases without the imposition of
punitive awards. 24 Similarly, punitive damages impose a "criminal" pen-
alty without affording the defendant the procedural safeguards accompa-
nying criminal proceedings. 25 In addition, punitive damages awards may
constitute an unjustified windfall to plaintiffs who have already been fully
compensated for harm incurred. 26 Further, granting early plaintiffs the
19. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1991).
20. Seltzer, supra note 5, at 47-48; see also Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15 (describing
traditional approach in awarding punitive damages); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908 cmt. d (1977) (same); Ellis, supra note 3, at 37-39 (same).
21. Seltzer, supra note 5, at 47.
22. See, e.g., Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1395-1405 (3d Cir.) (Weis, J., dis-
senting) (arguing against awarding punitive damages in mass tort cases), cert. de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993);Jackson v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 530
(5th Cir. 1984) (expressing concern for "continued viability of... cause of action
for present and future claimants"), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) ("We have the gravest
difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of
actions throughout the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill."); Dan
Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 559, 564-65 (1992) (arguing that
punitive damages reform is necessary to reduce threat of runaway jury verdicts);
Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 15, at 1385 (arguing that punitive damages awards
are "run [ning] wild"). But see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1309-33 (arguing
that punitive damages awards are necessary).
23. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 6, § 2.2(A) (2), at 26 ("One argument is
that it is absurd and unjust to award the plaintiff punitive damages when full com-
pensation has already been made.").
24. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840-41 (2d Cir.
1967) (arguing that multiple punitive damages awards will serve as deterrence to
defendant). Judge Friendly, in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., believed that
"[c]riminal penalties and heavy compensatory damages . . . should sufficiently
meet [the objectives of punitive damages]." Id. at 841. For a further discussion of
Roginsky, see Ausness, supra note 15, at 10-14. For a discussion of the objectives of
punitive damages awards, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
25. ENTERPRIsE REsPONSIBILrlv, supra note 3, at 26-28; see also Ellis, supra note
6, at 991-99 (discussing need for separation of civil and criminal remedies); Carl
W. Chamberlain, Note, Punitive Damages in California: The Drunken Driver, 36 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 793, 798 (1985) ("Civil law, in which punitive damages awards are as-
sessed, does not offer [procedural safeguards afforded criminal defendants].").
26. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 6, § 2.2(A) (2), at 28; see also Ellen Wert-
heimer, Punitive Damages and Strict Products Liability: An Essay in Oxymoron, 39 VILL.
L. REv. 505, 522 (1994) (arguing that punitive damages awards constitute unjusti-
fied windfall to plaintiff).
1994] 1109
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benefit of repetitive punitive damages awards may prevent later plaintiffs
from recovering even compensatory damages.2 7 Finally, numerous com-
mentators also argue that imposing repetitive punitive damages awards, if
not inequitable, remains at the very least unconstitutional. 28
III. BACKGROUND OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
A. Introduction
In response to the increased frequency with which courts award puni-
tive damages,29 defendants have raised numerous constitutional argu-
ments challenging the validity of such awards.3 0 A viable constitutional
argument against the imposition of punitive damages awards is grounded
in the Due Process Clause.3 ' The United States Supreme Court has held
that the Due Process Clause may impose some limitations on punitive
27. ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 260-61; see also Roginsky, 378
F.2d at 839 ("[i t [does not] seem either fair or practicable to limit punitive recov-
eries to an indeterminate number of first-comers, leaving it to some unascertained
court to cry, 'hold, enough.' "); Ellis, supra note 6, at 975 (arguing that prospect of
punitive damages might prompt race to courthouse in which those plaintiffs arriv-
ing first will deplete funds available to compensate all wronged parties); Wert-
heimer, supra note 26, at 515-17 (arguing that multiple punitive damages awards
may result in inability of future plaintiffs to recover).
Multiple punitive damages awards have forced some manufacturers to file for
bankruptcy. ENrERPRISE RESPONSIBILrrv, supra note 3, at 261 n.50. For example,
A.H. Robins Company, manufacturers of the Dalkon Shield, paid out over $25
million in punitive damages before filing for bankruptcy protection. Id. In addi-
tion, 11 of the 25 major asbestos companies have filed for bankruptcy. Dunn, 1
F.3d 1371, 1394 (3d Cir.) (Weis, J., dissenting) (citing JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD
Hoc COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED
STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1991),
reprinted in ASBESTOS LmG. REP. 22,698, 22,702-03 (1991) [hereinafter JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE AD Hoc Comm.])), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993).
28. For a discussion of the constitutional arguments against the imposition of
punitive damages, see infra notes 29-99 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of the increased frequency of punitive damages awards,
see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
30. James R. May, Fashioning Procedural and Substantive Due Process Arguments in
Toxic and Other Tort Actions Involving Punitive Damages After Pacific Mutual Life In-
surance Co. v. Haslip, 22 ENvTL. L. 573, 574 (1992). These arguments have largely
been rejected by the United States Supreme Court. Id. For a detailed discussion
of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards, see SCHLUETER & REDDEN,
supra note 6, § 3, at 37-70 (discussing Due Process Clause challenges, First Amend-
ment challenges, Confrontation Clause challenges, Self-Incrimination Clause chal-
lenges, Double Jeopardy Clause challenges and Eighth Amendment challenges to
punitive damages awards).
31. For a discussion of arguments grounded on the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution, see infra notes 63-99 and accompanying text.
1110 [Vol. 39: p. 1105
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damages awards.3 2 Nonetheless, the Court has yet to find a punitive dam-
ages award that violates any provision of the United States Constitution.3 3
In addition, defendants have previously attempted to argue for the
unconstitutionality of punitive damages awards under both the Double
Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses.3 4 The Supreme Court has, how-
ever, explicitly refused to strike down a punitive damages award under
either the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment3 5 or the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.3
6
B. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that
no person shall be punished for the same offense more than once.3 7 De-
fendants have argued that an imposition of both punitive damages awards
and criminal prosecution violates this principle of double jeopardy.3 8
32. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991). For a de-
tailed discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Haslip, see infra notes 71-86
and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 . Ct. 2711,
2713 (1993) (upholding punitive damages award against constitutional chal-
lenges); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 9-20 (same); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 277-80 (1989) (same); United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435, 442 (1989) (same); see also May, supra note 30, at 574-79 (discussing
evolution of constitutional punitive damage arguments in Supreme Court). For a
discussion of TXO, see infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of Haslip, see infra notes 71-86 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Brown-
ing-Ferris, see infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
34. For a discussion of the arguments grounded on the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the United States Constitution, see infra notes 37-50 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the arguments grounded on the Excessive Fines Clause of
the United States Constitution, see infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
35. Halper, 490 U.S. at 450-51. For a discussion of Halper, see infra notes 39-50
and accompanying text.
36. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 275, For a discussion of Browning-Ferris, see
infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id.
38. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 6, § 3.9, at 54. A few states have ac-
cepted this argument. However, the majority of courts have found that no double
jeopardy violation arises because "punitive damages and criminal sanctions redress
private and public wrongs, respectively, and each should operate independently in
its own sphere." Id.
1994] 1111
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The Supreme Court examined whether a civil penalty may constitute
a violative punishment for purposes of double jeopardy in United States v.
Halper.3 9 In Halper, the plaintiff filed sixty-five false claims for reimburse-
ment to Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York.4° In a criminal
prosecution, the defendant was punished with a jail term and a $5,000
fine. 41 In a separate action, the defendant was subject to $130,000 in civil
liability for the same crimes.42 The defendant claimed that dual punish-
ment for the same conduct violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. 43
The Supreme Court's analysis began with an examination of whether
a civil penalty constituted punishment under the Due Process Clause.4
Because Halper involved the imposition of both criminal and civil penal-
ties, the Double Jeopardy Clause was also invoked.45 The Court con-
cluded that a civil penalty "may be so extreme . . . as to constitute
punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause.4 6 In reaching this con-
clusion, the Court noted that, in order to determine whether a particular
civil sanction constitutes punishment under the DoubleJeopardy Clause, a
court must examine the penalty imposed and the objectives for its imposi-
39. 490 U.S. 435, 446 (1989).
40. Id. at 437. The plaintiff worked for a company that provided medical serv-
ices for Medicare patients. Id. In the course of his employment, he filed false
claims and was subsequently charged with multiple violations of a federal false
claims law. Id. at 437-38.
41. Id. at 441.
42. Id. The defendant was subject to the $130,000 liability for his false claims,
although the claims amounted to only $585. Id.
43. Id. For the text of the Double Jeopardy Clause, see supra note 37.
44. Id. The Court concluded that the civil False Claims Act subjected the de-
fendant to civil fines for false claims. Id. For an examination of the civil False
Claims Act, see 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1991).
45. Id. at 450. The Court applied its analysis to the present case and found
that the civil penalty was assessed for the purposes of retribution and deterrence
and therefore violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 449-52.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Halper has been the subject of discussion
in a number of law reviews. See, e.g., David J. Stone, The Opportunity of Austin v.
United States: Toward a Functional Approach to Civil Forfeiture and the Eighth Amend-
ment, 73 B.U. L. Rlv. 427, 438-40 (1993) (discussing Supreme Court's distinction
between civil and criminal actions in Halper); Andrew Z. Glickman, Note, Civil
Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy Clause: Applying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to
Parallel Proceedings After United States v. Halper, 76 VA. L. REv. 1251, 1261-63
(1990) (discussing Supreme Court's new approach, "necessitating a determination
of whether a civil penalty may constitute 'punishment' for purposes of a multiple
punishment analysis"); Elizabeth S. Jahnck, Note, United States v. Halper, Punitive
Civil Fines, and the Double jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 112,
132-34 (1991) (discussing Supreme Court's "As-Applied" approach as adopted in
Halper).
46. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 442 (1989). The government as-
serted that a civil remedy does not constitute punishment because Congress pro-
vided for civil recovery that exceeds actual damages. Id.
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tion.47 The Court then found that a civil penalty that serves the dual
objectives of retribution and deterrence constitutes punishment within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause.48 Therefore, the Court ultimately
concluded that a defendant who is punished in a criminal prosecution
may not be subject to an additional civil penalty when the objectives of the
civil sanction are deterrence or retribution.49 The Supreme Court did
note, however, that "[t]he protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause
[were] not triggered by litigation between private parties."50
C. The Excessive Fines Clause of the United States Constitution
The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment proscribes the
imposition of "excessive fines" and "cruel and unusual punishment."5 1
Not surprisingly, defendants have attempted to persuade courts that puni-
tive damages awards, especially multiple awards, constitute inherently ex-
cessive, cruel and unusual punishment. 52 Nonetheless, courts have
consistently rejected these arguments at both the state and federal levels.53
In Browning-Fenris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,5 4 the
United States Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause does
not apply to civil punitive damages awards.55 In Browning-Ferris, the plain-
tiff alleged that the defendant violated antitrust regulations and interfered
with contractual relations.56 At the district court level, ajury awarded the
plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages awards.5 7 The defend-
47. Id. at 448. The Court concluded by stating that civil and criminal sanc-
tions constitute punishment when the sanction serves the goals of punishment. Id.
48. Id. The Court noted that "punishment serves the twin aims of retribution
and deterrence." Id.
49. Id. at 448-49.
50. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451. This statement remains dictum but emphatic. See
May, supra note 30, at 574-75 (noting that Fifth Amendment prohibition against
double jeopardy does not apply in actions between private parties); Robert E.
Riggs, Constitutionalizing Punitive Damages: The Limits of Due Process, 52 OHIO L.J.
859, 862-63 (1991) (noting that Double Jeopardy Clause protections are not trig-
gered unless litigation involves government as party).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted." Id.
52. For a discussion of the arguments grounded in the Excessive Fines Clause,
see infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Palmer v. A.H. Robins, Co., 684 P.2d 187, 195 (Colo. 1984) (up-
holding punitive damages award against manufacturer of IUD).
54. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
55. Id. at 262. For a discussion of the Court's reasoning in Browning-Ferris, see
infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
56. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 261. Plaintiff alleged that defendant at-
tempted to monopolize the Burlington roll-off market in violation of § 2 of the
Sherman Act. Id. In addition, the plaintiffs contended that the defendant inter-
fered with the plaintiffs' contractual relations in violation of Vermont tort law. Id.
57. Id. at 262. After finding the defendant liable on both counts of the com-
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ant argued that the district court's award of punitive damages violated the
Excessive Fines Clause.5 8
Having granted certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Excessive
Fines Clause does not apply to punitive damages awards in cases between
private parties. 59 In support of this holding, the Court noted that the
framers of the Constitution were not concerned with the extent of civil
damages.60 In addition, the language of the Excessive Fines Clause clearly
places limits on governmental action that can be taken against an individ-
ual.6 1 The Supreme Court's holding in Browning-Fernis effectively elimi-
nated any future Excessive Fines Clause arguments against the imposition
of punitive damages awards in the civil context. 6
2
D. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.63 The Due Process Clause
contains both a procedural and a substantive component.64 The proce-
dural component of due process assures that a state will afford defendants
58. Id. For the language of the Excessive Fines Clause, see supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
59. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 260. The Supreme Court has never "even inti-
mated, that the Eighth Amendment serves as a check on the power of a jury to
award damages in a civil case." Id. at 259-60.
60. Id. at 273-74. Further, the Eighth Amendment indicates an intent to deal
only with the prosecutorial powers of the government. Id. at 275.
61. Id. For a further discussion of the Court's reasoning in Browning-Ferris, see
Donald S. Yarab, Note, Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.: The Ex-
cessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages, 40 CASE W. REs. L. Rxv. 569, 571-74 (1990)
(discussing Supreme Court's reasoning for holding that Excessive Fines Clause
does not apply to punitive damages in cases between private parties).
62. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 275 ("We think it clear ... that the Eighth
Amendment places limits on the steps a government may take against an
individual.").
Notably, the Browning-Ferris Court left open the prospect of construing a con-
stitutional challenge against punitive damages on the basis of the Due Process
Clause. Id. at 276-77. The Supreme Court explicitly refused to consider this issue
because it was not raised by the lower courts. Id. at 277. The Court did, however,
express a willingness to address a due process challenge in a proper case. Id.
63. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Section One of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Id.
64. May, supra note 30, at 588. See generally LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONsTrTUmONAL LAw (1988) (discussing procedural and substantive aspects of
Due Process Clause of United States Constitution).
1114 .[Vol. 39: p. 1105
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss4/12
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
fundamentally fair procedural safeguards before constitutional depriva-
tions occur.6 5 In the context of punitive damages awards, the substantive
component of due process imposes limitations on the size of the award. 66
Both the substantive and procedural components of the Due Process
Clause provide a basis for constitutional challenges against punitive dam-
ages awards. 67 The United States Supreme Court recently addressed this
argument in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip68 and TXO Produc-
tion Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.69 To date, the Due Process Clause re-
mains the most viable constitutional basis for striking a punitive damages
award in a mass tort case. 70
In Haslip, the defendant, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company,
contested the constitutionality of a punitive damages award under the Due
Process Clause.71 The plaintiff in Haslip alleged that Pacific Mutual's
agent failed to remit her insurance premiums to the defendant, 72 causing
65. May, supra note 30, at 588 (discussing procedural due process analysis of
punitive damages awards); see, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884)
(noting that procedural due process extols "those fundamental principles of lib-
erty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions"); see
also TRIBE, supra note 64, at 629-32, 663-768 (discussing procedural due process);
Riggs, supra note 50, at 880-81.
66. May, supra note 30 at 607. Two substantive due process arguments arise in
the punitive damages context. Id. at 576. First, in an action involving a single
award, defendant may argue that the award is so excessive as to violate due process.
Id. Second, in an action involving multiple awards, defendant may argue that the
aggregate of the awards is so excessive as to violate due process. Id. at 576-77; see
also TRIBE, supra note 64, at 553-86, 1302-1435 (discussing substantive due pro-
cess); Riggs, supra note 50, at 876-80 (same).
67. May, supra note 30, at 577 (realizing that Supreme Court anticipates puni-
tive damages award will be challenged as procedurally or substantially deficient in
violation of Fourteenth Amendment); see, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d
996, 1003-08 (3d Cir.) (refusing to strike down award of punitive damages under
Due Process Clause), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); Cathey v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1571 (6th Cir. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021
(1986); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1188 (8th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Palmer v. A.H. Robins, Co., 684 P.2d 187, 214-17
(Colo. 1984) (same); see also Riggs, supra note 50, at 870-76 (discussing procedural
and substantive due process challenges to punitive damages awards).
68. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's due process
analysis of punitive damages in Haslip, see infra notes 71-86 and accompanying
text.
69. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's due pro-
cess analysis of punitive damages in TXO, see infra notes 86-93 and accompanying
text.
70. See Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1389 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650
(1993) (refusing to preclude defendant from invoking Due Process Clause to inval-
idate punitive damages awards). For a discussion of Dunn, see infra notes 145-90
and accompanying text.
71. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 7.
72. Id. at 4-5. Defendant's agent was to collect insurance payments at defend-
ant's offices. Id. at 5. Rather than remit the payments, however, the defendant's
agent misappropriated the funds. Id. In order to hold defendant liable for these
acts under a theory of respondeat superior, the trial court first determined that
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the plaintiff's insurance to lapse without her knowledge. 73 The plaintiff
was subsequendy hospitalized and required to pay her bill in full upon her
release from the hospital.74 At trial, the jury awarded compensatory dam-
ages of $200,000 and punitive damages of $840,000. 75 The Supreme
Court of Alabama affirmed both damages awards. 76 The United States
Supreme Court then affirmed the constitutionality of the punitive dam-
ages award, which was four times that of the compensatory award.7 7 The
Haslip Court concluded that the Due Process Clause does not prohibit a
particular punitive damages award; 78 an award may be limited by the re-
quirements of due process. 79
The "general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance
from the [district) court" define the constitutional limits placed on puni-
tive damages awards.80 In Haslip, punitive damages were assessed by the
defendant's agent was acting as an employee of the defendant and within the
scope of employment. Id. at 12-15. This initial determination was necessary before
considering the constitutionality of the punitive damages award. Id. at 12.
73. Id. at 5. Although notices of the lapsed payments were sent to plaintiff,
the trial court found that plaintiff did not know her policy had been canceled. Id.
74. Id. When plaintiff was unable to pay her bill in full, her account was
placed with a collection agency and her credit was adversely affected. Id.
75. Id. at 7 n.2. This award constituted the judgment against both the defend-
ant's agent and the defendant. Id. at 7. Three other plaintiffs received awards that
totaled approximately $38,000. Id.
76. Id.; see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537, 543 (Ala.
1989) (holding punitive damages recoverable for deceit and willful fraud and af-
firming punitive damages award).
77. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 7-8, 24.
78. Id. at 17-18. The Court did not specifically indicate whether the due pro-
cess concerns were substantive or procedural. Riggs, supra note 50, at 871. Never-
theless, some lower courts have recognized that the requirements of substantive
due process may limit the amount of ajury award. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) (expressing concern of "overkill" if
multiple plaintiffs recovered punitive damages from single defendant); Juzwin v.
Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1064 (D.NJ. 1989) (holding that due
process requires limit on defendant's punitive damages liability).
79. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18. The Court refused to "draw a mathematical bright
line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable
that would fit every case." Id.
80. Id. The Haslip Court identified several factors that could be used in deter-
mining the reasonableness of a punitive damages award. Id. at 21. These factors
include:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive dam-
ages award and the harm likely to regult from the defendant's conduct as
well as the harm that actually has occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensi-
bility of the defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct, the de-
fendant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency
of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the defendant of the
wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of hav-
ing the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the "financial position" of the
defendant; (e) all the costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal
sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in mitiga-
tion; and (g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for
the same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation.
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traditional common-law method.8 1 The Court held that this scheme was
"[not] so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitu-
tional."8 2 Specifically, the Court announced a two-pronged test to deter-
mine whether particular punitive damages awards were constitutional.8 3
First, the Court stated that jury instructions must place reasonable con-
straints on the exercise ofjury discretion in awarding punitive damages.8 4
Second, the Court found that sufficient post-verdict and appellate review
Id. at 21-22. For a further discussion of these factors, see Rustad & Koenig, supra
note 2, at 1311-18.
81. Hashp, 499 U.S. at 14. For a discussion of the common-law method of
awarding punitive damages, see supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
82. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 17. The Court reasoned that "[i]f a thing has been
[practiced] for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case
for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it." Id. (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,
486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988)). The Court went on to state that a long-established
precedent is not alone sufficient to render punitive damages awards constitutional.
Id. at 18. Rather, the Court examined the punitive damages award in Haslip in
order to determine whether it violated the Due Process Clause. Id.
83. Id. at 19-22.
84. Id. at 19-20. The Court applied this prong to the instructions given to thejury in the case at bar. Id. The jury was instructed as follows with regard to puni-
tive damages:
Now, if you find that fraud was perpetrated then in addition to com-
pensatory damages you may in your discretion, when I use the word dis-
cretion, I say you don't have to even find fraud, you wouldn't have to, but
you may, the law says you may award an amount of money known as puni-
tive damages.
This amount of money is awarded to the plaintiff but it is not to
compensate the plaintiff for any injury. It is to punish the defendant.
Punitive means to punish or it is also called exemplary damages, which
means to make an example. So, if you feel or not feel, but if you are
reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff, whatever plaintiff
you are talking about, has had a fraud perpetrated upon them and as a
direct result they were injured and in addition to compensatory damages
you may in your discretion award punitive damages.
Now, the purpose of awarding punitive or exemplary damages is to
allow money recovery to the plaintiffs, it does to the plaintiff, by way of
punishment to the defendant and for the added purpose of protecting
the public by deterring the defendant and others from doing such wrong
in the future. Imposition of punitive damages is entirely discretionary
with the jury, that means you don't have to award it unless this jury feels
that you should do so.
Should you award punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you must
take into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong as
shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong.
Id. at 6 n.1. The Court noted that the instructions "enlightened the jury as to the
punitive damages' nature and purpose, identified the damages as punishment for
civil wrongdoing of the kind involved, and explained that their imposition was not
compulsory." Id. at 19. The Court concluded that the jury instructions gave thejury "significant discretion in its determination of punitive damages .... But that
discretion was not unlimited." Id.
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procedures must ensure the particular awards are reasonable.8 5 The
Court ultimately concluded that these requirements afford a defendant
the full panoply of procedural protections, and thus satisfy the require-
ments of due process.8 6
Two years after Haslip, the Supreme Court re-examined the constitu-
tionality of a punitive damages award under the Due Process Clause in
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.8 7 In TXO, the TXO Produc-
tion Corporation (TXO) brought an action to remove a clouded title on
an interest in certain oil and gas development rights.88 The defendant,
Alliance Resources Corporation (Alliance), filed a counterclaim for slan-
der of title.8 9 The jury found for Alliance and awarded $19,000 in com-
pensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages-an award 526
times greater than the accompanying compensatory damages.90 TXO ap-
pealed, asserting that the punitive award was so excessive as to deprive
them of property without due process of law.
9 1
Although considering TXO's appeal, the Supreme Court refused to
formulate a bright line test for determining whether an excessive punitive
damages award failed to satisfy the requirements of due process.92 Rather,
85. Id. at 20-23. Applying this prong to the facts of Haslip, the Court found
the review procedures imposed "a sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint
on the discretion of [the] factfinders in awarding punitive damages." Id. at 22.
86. Id. at 23. Punitive damages awarded in Haslip were four times the amount
of compensatory damages. Id. at 23. The Court, however, believed that the award
"does not cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety." Id. at 24.
87. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2718
(1993). Plurality, concurring and dissenting opinions were written in this case,
with three justices joining in each opinion. Id. at 2713-14. This Casebrief refers
solely to the plurality opinion.
88. Id. at 2714.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2717. The jury's basis for the punitive damages award evidenced
that TXO had knowledge that Alliance had good title to the oil and gas develop-
ment rights. Id. at 2715-16. Therefore, the Court found that TXO acted in bad
faith in advancing a claim on the basis of a worthless quitclaim deed. Id.
91. Id. at 2717. To support their contention that the punitive damages award
violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, TXO argued:
[T]he punitive damages award violated the Due Process Clause ... [be-
cause] under the 'general punitive damage instruction given in this case,
the jury was left to their own devices without any yardstick as to what was a
reasonable punitive damages award.... [F]or that reason, a vagueness,
lack of guideline and the lack of any requirement of a reasonable rela-
tionship between the actual injury and the punitive damage award ...
should cause the Court to set it aside on Constitutional grounds.'
Id. (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 2720. The parties in this case wanted to formulate a test for deter-
mining whether "a particular punitive [damages] award is grossly excessive." Id. at
2719. Alliance offered a rational basis standard, which the Court rejected because
"any award that would serve the legitimate state interest in deterring or punishing
wrongful conduct, no matter how large, would be acceptable." Id. The Court also
rejected TXO's proffered heightened scrutiny standard. Id. Citing their holding
in Haslip, the Court once again found that "[w] e need not, and indeed we cannot,
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the Court found that a "reasonable relationship between the punitive
damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct
[should exist,] as well as the harm that actually has occurred."9 3
Recently, in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,94 the Supreme Court applied its
holding in Haslip and found that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment requires judicial review of the amount of a punitive
damage award.95 In Oberg, the plaintiff brought an action in Oregon
against the manufacturer of a three-wheeled all-terrain vehicle that over-
turned while the plaintiff was driving it.96 A jury awarded the plaintiff
both compensatory and punitive damages and the defendant subsequently
argued that the punitive damages award violated the Due Process
Clause. 97
Applying its earlier decision in Haslip, the Supreme Court held that
the Due Process Clause requires judicial review of the amount of punitive
damages. In Oberg, Oregon law provided no procedure for reducing or
setting aside a punitive damages award if the only basis for doing so is the
amount of the award.98 Therefore, the Court concluded that Oregon's
denial ofjudicial review of the size of punitive damages awards violates the
Due Process Clause.99
draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case. We can say, however, that
[a] general concer[n] of reasonableness ... properly enter[s] into the constitu-
tional calculus." Id. at 2720 (quoting Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)).
The Court did, however, list several factors that should be considered in deter-
mining whether a punitive damages award is reasonable under the Due Process
Clause. Id. at 2721-22. For example, the amount of punitive damages should bear
some relationship to the amount of compensatory damages and the potential
harm that might result from the defendant's conduct. Id.
93. Id. at 2721 (quoting Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1, 21 (1991)). The Court then evaluated the amount of the punitive damages
award in TXO. Id. In holding that no violation of due process occurred, the Court
believed the award was reasonable in relation to the potential loss to Alliance and
the bad faith of TXO. Id. at 2722. The Court did not find the "dramatic disparity
between the actual damages and the punitive award controlling." Id.
94. 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
95. Id. at 2335.
96. Id. The all-terrain vehicle overturned while the plaintiff was driving it,
causing severe and permanent injuries. The plaintiff, who sought both compensa-
tory and punitive damages, alleged that the manufacturer knew or should have
known that the vehicle had an inherently and unreasonably dangerous design. Id.
at 2334.
97. Id. The defendant argued that the punitive damages award violated the
Due Process Clause because the award was excessive and Oregon courts lack the
power to correct excessive verdicts. Id.
98. Id. at 2339. Rather, an Oregon court may only order a new trial on the
basis of the punitive damages award "if the jury was not properly instructed, if
error occurred during the trial, or if there is no evidence to support any punitive
damages at all." Id.
99. Id. at 2341. In support of its holding, the Court noted that "U]udicial
review of the amount [of punitive damages] awarded was one of the few proce-
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IV. CIRCUIT COURT POSMONS
A. Procedural Due Process
The procedural requirements of due process ensure a fair method of
assessing punitive damages awards against defendants. 100 In Haslip, the
Supreme Court set forth the current standard for assessing the constitu-
tionality of a punitive damages award under procedural due process re-
quirements.10 1 In order to understand the decision in Dunn v. HOVIC,
the leading Third Circuit case on the constitutionality of punitive damages
awards, two circuit courts' contrasting applications of the Haslip standard
must be examined. 102
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Glasscock v.
Armstrong Cork Co.103 ruled that punitive damages awarded to the plaintiff
satisfied the constitutional requirements of due process.10 4 In Glasscock,
the plaintiffs were allegedly injured from over-exposure to the defendant's
asbestos products. 10 5 The jury ultimately found for the plaintiffs. 10 6 In
dural safeguards which the common law provided against [the] danger" of bias
against any particular defendant. Id.
100. For a discussion of the procedural requirements of due process, see
supra note 65 and accompanying text.
101. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1991) (outlining
procedural due process requirements in Hashp, including reasonable jury instruc-
tions and adequate trial and appellate court review of punitive damages award).
For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Haslip, see supra notes
71-86 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge, previously articulated another test
for determining whether the requirements of due process are satisfied. 424 U.S.
319, 334 (1976). The Mathews test includes the following three considerations:
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335. The majority in Haslip did not apply this test in determining whether
the punitive damages award violated the requirements of due process. Haslip, 499
U.S. at 19-22; see also Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory
of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 30-57 (1976) (discussing Mathews test); Riggs, supra
note 50, at 880-93 (same).
102. Compare Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d 1085, 1097-99 (5th
Cir. 1991) (holding punitive damages award satisfied due process), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1778 (1992) with Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.
1991) (holding punitive damages award violated due process).
103. 946 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1778 (1992).
104. Id. at 1099-100. Defendant Celotex alleged that the excessiveness of the
punitive damages award violated substantive due process requirements. Id. at
1095-97. In addition, defendant averred that the method of awarding punitive
damages violated the procedural requirements of due process. Id. at 1097-99.
105. Id. at 1088. As a consolidation action, this case involved the claims of
several insulation installers and their spouses. Id.
106. Id.
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addition to awarding compensatory damages, the jury awarded punitive
damages twenty times greater than the compensatory award.10 7
Celotex, a defendant in Glasscock, argued that imposing multiple pu-
nitive damages awards in mass tort cases, like asbestos litigation, defeated
the purposes behind punitive damages awards.108 In addition, the defend-
ant urged the Fifth Circuit to preserve resources so the company could
satisfy future compensatory claims.' 0 9 The Fifth Circuit rejected these ar-
guments, reasoning that each plaintiff who is injured by a single defendant
has a right to receive independent compensation. 0
In analyzing the alleged due process violations, the Fifth Circuit
sought next to interpret the Supreme Court's decision in Haslip."' The
court examined the procedural due process requirements outlined in Has-
lip 2 and proceeded to evaluate the district court's scheme for awarding
punitive damages in Glasscock.' 3 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the jury
instructions in Glasscock sufficiently met the first prong of the Supreme
107. Glasscock, 946 F.2d at 1088. The jury awarded a total of $317,625 in com-
pensatory damages awards and $6,100,000 in punitive damages awards against de-
endant Celotex. Id.
108. Id. at 1096. For a discussion of the purposes of punitive damages, see
supra note 15 and accompanying text.
The Fifth Circuit first examined defendant's argument that the punitive dam-
ages award was excessive. Id. at 1095-96. The applicable law in this case, Texas
law, requires "punitive damages to be reasonably proportioned to actual damages."
Id. at 1095 (citing Alamo National Bank of San Antonio v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908,
910 (Tex. 1981)). The court concluded that the award was not so excessive as to
violate the Texas rule of proportionality. Id. at 1096. In addition, defendant failed
to show the award was the "result of passion rather than reason." Id.
109. Id. at 1096. The Third Circuit dissenters in Dunn also believed repeated
punitive damages awards would affect a defendant's ability to satisfy future com-
pensatory claims. Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1395 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 650 (1993). For a detailed discussion of the dissenting opinion in Dunn, see
infra notes 173-90 and accompanying text.
110. Glasscock, 946 F.2d at 1096-97. The court could find no principle of law
that limits "recovery of punitive damages to the first claimant." Id. at 1097; see, e.g.,
McCleary v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 913 F.2d 257, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1990);
Edwards v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 911 F.2d 1151, 1154-55 (5th Cir. 1990).
111. Glasscock, 946 F.2d at 1097-99. The Supreme Court in Hastip rejected a
due process challenge of a punitive damages award totalling four times that of the
compensatory award. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24. For a further discussion of the
Court's reasoning in Haslip, see supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
112. Glasscock, 946 F.2d at 1097-98. The Haslip Court examined the specific
procedures employed by the trial court. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 18-19 (1991). The Court concluded that the discretion accorded to the
jury as well as the trial and appellate 'eview procedures sufficiently satisfied due
process requirements. Id. at 19.
113. Glasscock, 946 F.2d at 1097. In Glasscock, the trial court instructed the
jury:
[I]f [defendant] Celotex had acted willfully, maliciously, intentionally or
with heedless and reckless disregard for plaintiffs' rights, 'the law would
allow you in your discretion to assess punitive damages against the De-
fendant as punishment and as deterrent to others.' ... [I]n making your
determination as to punitive damages you will consider the totality of the
17
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Court's due process requirements. 1 4 Satisfied that due process was af-
forded, the court then examined the review procedures required by Has-
lipl1 5 and concluded that adequate review procedures ensured the jury
award was reasonable."t 6 The Fifth Circuit further noted that although
the punitive damages award in this case was "high," it was not so excessive
as to violate due process. 117
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit's holding in Glasscock, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Mattison v. Dallas Carrier
Corp.," 8 ruled that a punitive damages award violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 1 9 In Mattison, plaintiffs were injured af-
ter striking a tractor trailer owned by the defendant.' 20 A jury awarded
the plaintiffs a total of $125,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in
punitive damages. 1 1 Defendants appealed, alleging that the punitive
damages award violated the Due Process Clause.' 22
To determine whether a constitutional violation occurred in Mattison,
the Fourth Circuit applied the two-pronged test outlined by the Supreme
Court in Haslip.123 As required by the first prong in Haslip, the Fourth
circumstances, and you may consider the financial resources of the De-
fendant in fixing the amount of damages.
Id. For the language of the jury instructions in Haslip, see supra note 84.
114. Glasscock, 946 F.2d at 1098. The Fifth Circuit believed "[i]t was clear
from this (jury] instruction that the jury could refuse to award punitive damages."
Id.
115. Id. at 1098-99. Due process requires adequate trial court and appellate
review of a punitive damages award. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20-23.
116. Glasscock, 946 F.2d at 1099. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged a difference
in the review procedures in this case and those in Haslip. Id. Nevertheless, the
court did not find that these differences resulted in a due process violation. Id.
Because the court interpreted the review procedures in Haslip to represent only
one model, a duplicate scheme is not necessary to satisfy the requirements of due
process. Id.
117. Id.
118. 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991).
119. Id. at 98. The Fourth Circuit relied on the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which states in pertinent part: "nor shall any person . . . be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
120. Mattison, 947 F.2d at 98. Plaintiffs collided with defendant's tractor
trailer when it stopped in an emergency lane. Id.
121. Id. The Fourth Circuit noted that defendant corporation was worth only
$6,428 at the time of the verdict. Id.
122. Id. at 98. The defendant also alleged a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution. Id.
123. Id. at 104. The Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court examined
"the post-verdict process, passing lightly over the pre-verdict process which gives
rise to the verdict in the first place." Id. at 99. This analysis reveals whether a
punitive damages award satisfies the requirements of due process. Id. For a discus-
sion of the Supreme Court's holding in Haslip, see supra notes 71-86 and accompa-
nying text.
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Circuit carefully analyzed the district court's jury instructions. 124 The
Fourth Circuit held that because the instructions conferred unlimited dis-
cretion on the jury to determine the appropriate amount of punitive dam-
ages, the first Haslip prong remained unsatisfied.125
Next, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the second prong adopted in Has-
lip.12 6 As noted earlier, under this prong, adequate trial court and appel-
late review must exist as criteria for the reasonableness of punitive
damages awards.' 27 Although the amount of the punitive damages award
in Mattison remained purely within the discretion of the jury, the Fourth
Circuit observed that both the trial and appellate courts could review the
award for excessiveness.' 28 Nevertheless, because no criteria were pro-
vided for the reviewing court to determine excessiveness, the Fourth Cir-
cuit found that the second prong of Haslip also remained unsatisfied. 12 9
B. Substantive Due Process
The substantive requirements of due process protect a defendant
from multiple and/or excessive punitive damages awards.' 30 The
Supreme Court in Haslip expressly stated that the size of a punitive dam-
ages award may implicate due process concerns.13 ' More recently, in
TXO, a plurality of the Court examined a substantive due process chal-
124. Id. at 105. The court noted that punitive damages may be awarded in
South Carolina to "punish, deter, and vindicate the rights of the plaintiff whenever
the conduct of the defendant is willful, wanton or reckless." Id. at 100 (citing Rog-
ers v. Florence Printing Co., 106 S.E.2d 258, 261, 263 (1958)).
125. Id. at 105-08. The court stated: "When ajury is left to its own devices to
take property or mete out punishment to whatever extent it feels is best in the
course of process, our sensibilities about [due] process are offended." Id. at 105.
In support of its conclusion, the court found the South Carolina scheme too vague
and lacking in sufficient guidance for the jury to assess punitive damages. Id.
126. Id. at 106-08.
127. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20-23. For a discussion o f the Haslip requirements of
procedural due process, see supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
128. Mattison, 947 F.2d at 99, 106. The appellate court may review the award
under an "abuse-of-discretion standard." Id. at 100. Under this standard of review,
a reversal by an appellate court is very difficult, as no substantial evidence to sup-
port the award may exist. Id.
129. Id. at 106. The court reasoned that "[w]hen a court reviews an award of
punitive damages, it can only test the jury's award against its own notion of exces-
siveness." Id. The court concluded that a reviewing court could not "rationally
decide that the amount [of punitive damages] was excessive without simply substi-
tuting its notion of excessiveness for that of the jury." Id. at 105.
130. May, supra note 30, at 608 (stating concern that proportionately exces-
sive and multiple punitive damages awards against single defendant violate sub-
stantive due process); see also Riggs, supra note 50, at 876-80 (discussing punitive
damages awards and substantive due process). For a discussion of the substantive
requirements of due process, see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
131. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18. The Court did not, however, distinguish between
procedural and substantive due process. Riggs, supra note 50, at 871.
1994] 1123
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lenge to the size of punitive damages awards.13 2 Further, the analysis of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Simpson v.
Pittsburgh Coming Corp. demonstrates the predominant view regarding the
excessiveness of repetitive punitive damages awards under the Due Process
Clause. 13 3
In Haslip, the Supreme Court refused to "draw a mathematical bright-
line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unac-
ceptable" punitive damages awards.' 3 4 In TXO, however, the Court dis-
cussed the possibility of substantive due process limits on "grossly
excessive" punitive damages awards.' 3 5 Although still refusing to deline-
ate a test for determining when punitive damages awards become so exces-
sive as to violate due process, the Court reaffirmed the standard
established in Haslip.13 6
In Simpson, -the Second Circuit examined the excessiveness of repeti-
tive punitive damages awards under the Due Process Clause.13 7 The plain-
tiff brought suit for alleged injury to her deceased husband, resulting from
exposure to asbestos products manufactured by the defendant. 13 8 At trial,
the jury awarded the plaintiff both compensatory and punitive
damages.' 3 9
132. For a discussion of the Court's decision in TXO, see supra notes 87-93
and accompanying text.
133. See Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 280-81 (2d Cir.
1990) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to punitive damages award).
The majority of courts have similarly rejected the substantive due process chal-
lenge to excessive or multiple punitive damages awards. See Cathey v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1571 (6th Cir. 1985) (rejecting substantive
due process challenge to punitive damages award), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021
(1986); Leonen v.Johns-Manville Co., 717 F. Supp. 272, 278 (D.NJ. 1989) (same).
134. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
135. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2718-20
(1993).
136. Id. In Haslip, the Court noted that "general concerns of reasonableness
... properly enter into the constitutional calculus." Hasip, 499 U.S. at 18. The
TXO plurality once again refused to "draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit
every case." TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720 (quoting Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)).
The TXO Court did list several considerations that would assist in determining
reasonableness, including a comparison of the amount of actual damages with pu-
nitive damages. Id. at 2721. Nonetheless, the punitive damages award in TXO, 526
times that of the compensatory damages award, was upheld under this standard.
Id. at 2722-23.
137. Simpson, 901 F.2d at 277. The majority of courts have rejected the sub-
stantive due process challenge to excessive or multiple punitive damages awards.
See, e.g., id.; Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565 (6th Cir. 1985);
Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272 (D.N.J. 1989).
138. Simpson, 901 F.2d at 279. Decedent was employed by Rochester Gas and
Electric Company to work on the steam piping system. Id. This work brought him
in contact with asbestos pipe insulation products. Id.
139. Id. The jury awarded $1,277,000 in compensatory damages and
$2,300,000 in punitive damages. Id.
1124 [Vol. 39: p. 1105
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On appeal, the defendant alleged that multiple punitive damages
awards for the same wrong violated the due process requirements of the
United States Constitution.1 4o The defendant in Simpson urged the Sec-
ond Circuit to hold that the Due Process Clause precludes subsequent pu-
nitive damages judgments against any party previously assessed punitive
damages for identical wrongful conduct 1 4 1 The defendant also argued
that a multiple punitive damages award was "barred after the aggregate of
prior awards for the same conduct has reached the maximum amount tol-
erable under that clause."' 4 2
Because the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to support
either contention, the Second Circuit refused to decide whether either of
these substantive due process challenges would be successful.1 43 There-
fore, although the defendant did not prevail on these issues in Simpson,
the Second Circuit did not preclude future defendants from arguing that
repetitive punitive damages awards actually contravene due process
concerns.
44
V. THE THIRD CIRcurr's POSITION
The Third Circuit has recently articulated its position on the constitu-
tionality of multiple punitive damages awards in Dunn v. HOVIC.1 45 In
Dunn, the defendant argued that the assessment of multiple punitive dam-
ages awards violates the due process guaranteed by the United States Con-
stitution.146 The plaintiff sought to recover for asbestos-related injuries
allegedly caused by asbestos products manufactured by the defendant,
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp.147 The United States District Court for
140. Id. Defendant also averred procedural due process violations. Id. at 282-
84. Because this case was decided before the Supreme Court's decision in Haslip,
the Second Circuit was unable, however, to apply the current method of evaluating
procedural due process challenges. Id. Therefore, this portion of the opinion will
not be discussed in this Casebrief.
141. Id. at 280.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 281 ("In the pending case, the record is insufficient to support a
due process ruling on either of the theories we have outlined."). The Second Cir-
cuit noted that it had previously refused to conclude as to defendant's theories,
either because the claim was inadequately raised or inadequately supported at the
trial level. See id. at 282.
144. Id. at 281 ("Only with such factual information can the judge determine
that the aggregate of prior awards punishes the entirety of the wrongful conduct to
the limit of due process.").
145. 1 F.3d 1371 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993).
146. Id. at 1374. Defendant alternatively argued multiple awards of punitive
damages are prohibited under the law of the Virgin Islands, the applicable substan-
tive law. Id. This Casebrief will discuss only the federal due process reasoning of
the Third Circuit. For a discussion of the guarantees of due process in the United
States Constitution, see supra notes 63-99 and accompanying text.
147. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1374.
1994] 1125
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the District of the Virgin Islands awarded plaintiff $500,000 in compensa-
tory damages and $2 million in punitive damages. 148
The Third Circuit began its analysis in Dunn with a careful review of
the United States Supreme Court's holding in Haslip,149 recognizing that
the Supreme Court had refused to outline a bright-line test to determine
whether an award of punitive damages violated due process.150 The Third
Circuit then examined the Supreme Court's most recent analysis of this
issue in TXO. 151 The court read TXO as adhering "to the due process
formulation first articulated in Haslip."152
To determine whether the punitive damages award in Dunn violated
the constitutional requirements of procedural due process, 153 the Third
Circuit reviewed the jury instructions under the Haslip standard.15 4 The
court concluded that the instructions in the instant case were constitution-
ally defensible.1 55 The Third Circuit court next examined the post-trial
procedures to determine whether they ensured "meaningful and adequate
148. Id. at 1373. In 1992, the Third Circuit remitted the punitive damages
award to $1 million. Id. The Third Circuit later granted a rehearing en banc on
the issue of punitive damages only. Id. at 1373-74.
149. Id. at 1379. For a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in
Haslip, see supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
150. Hashp, 499 U.S. at 18. Rather, the Supreme Court in Haslip held that
"the common-law method for assessing punitive damages is [not] so inherently
unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitutional." Id. at 17.
The common law method for assessing punitive damages involves the follow-
ing three tiers: (1) the trial court first determines whether there has been a suffi-
cient showing to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury; (2) the jury next
determines the amount of punitive damages to be awarded, based on the conduct
of the defendant and the need to deter future similar undesirable conduct; and
(3) the trial judge and appellate courts finally review the jury's determination of
the award. See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1379-80. For a further discussion of the common
law method of awarding punitive damages, see supra notes 17-21 and accompany-
ing text.
151. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1380; see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2718 (1993). For a further discussion of the Supreme
Court's reasoning in TXO, see supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
152. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1380. The Third Circuit went on to state that "[a]bsent
further guidance from the Court, we will rely on Haslip's majority opinion in assess-
ing [defendant's] due process challenge in this case." Id.
153. Id. at 1379-82. For a discussion of the procedural due process require-
ments of the United States Constitution, see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
154. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1380. The Supreme Court in Haslip upheld the punitive
damages award even though the instructions gave the jury "significant discretion."
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19. For an examination of the instructions given to the jury in
Haslip, see supra note 84.
155. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1380. The jury instructions given in the instant case
contained all of the elements of the instructions in Haslip. Id. First, the instruc-
tions identified the purposes of punitive damages by stating "[the award] should
be an award which stings [i.e., punishes) the defendant and will act as a deterrent
to such conduct by the defendant in the future and a warning to others." Id. Sec-
ond, the instructions also "told the jury that it was not required to award punitive
damages." Id. Finally, the jury was instructed that "such damages are 'allowed only
for wanton and reckless behavior... [where] defendant's conduct was outrageous
1126 [Vol. 39: p. 1105
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review by the trial court."156 Ultimately, the Third Circuit found these
procedures to be adequate. 157
After resolving the procedural due process issue, the court addressed
the substantive due process requirements under the Constitution. 158 Sev-
eral courts and commentators have raised concerns over successive puni-
tive damages awards in mass tort cases arising from the same course of
conduct.159 The majority of federal and state courts, however, have re-
fused to strike punitive damages awards simply because they constitute re-
petitive punishment for the same wrong.16 0 The Third Circuit expressed
concern over imposing multiple punitive damages awards against a single
defendant but ruled such awards consistent with substantive due process
guarantees. 161 In support of its opinion, the Third Circuit noted that the
because done with an evil motive or done with reckless indifference to the rights of
others.' " Id. (citations omitted).
The Third Circuit relied on opinions of other circuit courts, which held that
similar jury charges satisfied the due process requirements under Haslip. Id.; see,
e.g., Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d 1085, 1097 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1778 (1992). For a detailed discussion of Glasscock, see supra
notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
The Third Circuit explicitly rejected the Fourth Circuit's holding in Mattison
v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991). See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1381. For
a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Mattison, see supra notes
119-29 and accompanying text.
156. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1381 (quoting Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Has-
lip, 499 U.S. 1, 16 (1991)). The court found that the scope of'trial and appellate
court review was important to the Supreme Court in Hastip. Id.
157. Id. at 1382. The Third Circuit noted that the district court initially re-
viewed the jury's award and found the evidence of defendant's conduct supported
a punitive damages award. Id.
158. Id. at 1382-91. For a discussion of substantive due process requirements,
see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
The Third Circuit first examined the defendant's argument that the punitive
damages award "was the result of passion, prejudice, or bias, and [therefore] the
district court should have ordered a new trial." Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1383. The Third
Circuit concluded that excessiveness of a jury award was not per se proof of pas-
sion, prejudice or bias, and thus, rejected this contention. Id.; see'also id. at 1382-84
(discussing court's reasoning for rejecting excessiveness argument).
159. Id. at 1385; see, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1005 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852, and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986); Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-42 (2d Cir. 1967); Richard A. Seltzer,
supra note 5; Alan Schulkin, supra note 5.
160. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 402-07 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Hansen v.Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734
F.2d 1036, 1041-42 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985); Palmer v.
A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 215-16 (Colo. 1984); Fischer v.Johns-Manville
Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 47 1-80 (NJ. 1986); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d
437, 466 (Wis. 1980).
161. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1386-87. The Third Circuit stated that "[t]o the extent
that [defendant] claims that punitive damages in asbestos cases are as a general
matter unconstitutional, we are not persuaded by its arguments." Id. at 1387.
1994] 1127
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Supreme Courtshas had numerous opportunities to restrict punitive dam-
ages awards and has yet to do so.
16 2
The Third Circuit specifically refused to preclude a future defendant
from invoking the Due Process Clause as a basis for striking a punitive
damages award. 163 Under Dunn, however, a future defendant must ade-
quately show that a due process violation occurred in order to support any
such claim. 164 Although the court concluded that the Due Process Clause
may limit the amount of punitive damages awarded,1 6 5 the court did not
determine precisely what these limits would be.1 66
162. Id. at 1388; see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S.
Ct. 2711 (1993) (upholding punitive damages award); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (same). For a further discussion of TXO, see supra notes
87-93 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Haslip, see supra notes
71-86 and accompanying text.
In addition, the Third Circuit noted that "no single court can fashion an effec-
tive response to the national problem flowing from mass exposure to asbestos
products." Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1386. Numerous courts and commentators have ex-
aminedpossible solutions to the mass tort problems. See, e.g., Roginsky, 378 F.2d at
838-41 (discussing need for reform in punitive damages awards); Richard A. Selt-
zer, supra note 5, at 42-48 (offering several solutions to punitive damages
problems); Alan Schulkin, supra note 5, at 1800-13 (same); see also ENTERPRISE
REsPONSIBILrrv, supra note 3, at 260-64, 389-437 (proposing alternative models of
assessing damages in mass tort cases).
The Third Circuit explicitly noted that the Restatement (Second) of Torts permits
consideration of the existence of multiple punitive damages claims against a de-
fendant as a factor in assessing damages. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1387. As such, the "mul-
tiple damages claims" language of the Restatement assumes that multiple awards areF ermissible. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. e (1977) ("Another
actor that may affect the amount of punitive damages is the existence of multiple
claims by numerous persons affected by the wrongdoer's conduct.").
163. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1389. The Third Circuit agreed with the Second Cir-
cuit's holding in Simpson, where the court rejected defendant's averment of a due
process violation because the defendant failed to present evidence as to prior puni-
tive damages awards. Id. (citing Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d
277, 281 (2d Cir. 1990)). For a further discussion of Simpson, see supra notes 137-
44 and accompanying text.
164. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1389. In order to find a due process violation, a defend-
ant must demonstrate the amount of punitive damages paid in the past and the
conduct for which the damages were awarded. Id. Further, the defendant in this
case had failed to produce any such evidence. Id. Thus, the defendant in the
instant case could not demonstrate any substantive due process violation. Id.
Additionally, the defendant in Dunn did not demonstrate an inability to pay
future awards of compensatory or punitive damages. Id. at 1390. The court noted
that the defendant had "approximately $1.26 billion in unexhausted insurance cov-
erage under product liability insurance policies applicable to asbestos-related per-
sonal injury claims." Id.
165. Id. at 1390-91. The court specifically refused to "decide whether another
asbestos manufacturer might be able to satisfy [the] evidentiary hurdle with a dif-
ferent factual record." Id. at 1391. In order to prevail with a due process chal-
lenge, the defendant must present evidence as to the total amount of punitive
damages assessed for a single wrongdoing and an inability to satisfy compensatory
and punitive damage claims. Id.
166. Id. at 1390. The defendant in this case failed to establish that the $1
million punitive damages award violated any due process restrictions. Id.
1128 [Vol. 39: p. 1105
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In upholding the punitive damages award in Dunn, the Third Circuit
rejected the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Mattison167 and adopted the
Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Glasscock.168 The Third Circuit's use of the
Fifth Circuit's analysis in Glasscock was appropriate for several reasons.
First, both Glasscock and Dunn involved the imposition of repetitive puni-
tive damages awards against an asbestos defendant. 169 Second, the jury
instructions in Dunn closely resembled the instructions given in Glasscock
and those given in Haslip.170 Third, the review procedures in Dunn, like
those in Glasscock, were adequate under the Haslip standard.17 1 There-
fore, the Third Circuit's acceptance of the Fifth Circuit's holding in Glass-
cock was both logical and consistent.172
The dissent in Dunn disagreed with the majority's decision to sustain
the punitive damages award. 173 In doing so, the dissent noted that several
courts have previously questioned punitive damages awards in mass tort
cases. 174 The dissent believed the uncertainty of these courts was further
intensified by the unique problems associated with asbestos litigation. 175
The dissent noted that such problems are illustrated by the "magnitude of
the asbestos litigation crisis."176
167. Id. at 1381. For a discussion of the court's reasoning in Mattison, see
supra notes 118-29 and accompanying text.
168. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1380.
169. For a discussion of Glasscock, see supra notes 103-17 and accompanying
text.
170. For a discussion of the jury instructions in Dunn, see supra note 155 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the jury instructions in Haslip, see supra
note 84 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the jury instructions in Glass-
cock, see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
171. For a discussion of the review procedures in Dunn, see supra notes 156-57
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the review procedures in Haslip, see
supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the review proce-
dures in Glasscock, see supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
172. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1381 (acknowledging that "we agree with the holding in
Glasscock"). For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Glasscock, see supra
notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
173. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1393 (Weis, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Judge
Weis' strong dissent in Dunn, see infra notes 174-90 and accompanying text.
174. Id. at 1395 (Weis, J., dissenting); see, e.g., In re Bendectin Prod. Liab. Li-
tig., 749 F.2d 300, 305-07 (6th Cir. 1984) (questioning punitive damages awards in
mass tort cases); In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig.,
693 F.2d 847, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) ("We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving how
claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the nation
can be so administered as to avoid overkill.").
175. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1393 (Weis, J., dissenting) (noting that number of per-
sons exposed to asbestos caused proliferation of claims).
176. Id. at 1395 (Weis, J., dissenting). First, the number of asbestos claims
filed in both state and federal courts total approximately 90,000. Id. at 1394 (Weis,
J., dissenting) (citing JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc Comm. ON ASBESTOS LrrIo.,
REPORT TO THE CHIEFJUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, reprinted in ASBESTOS LrrIT. REP. 22,698,
22,702-03 (1991)). Second, 11 of the 25 major asbestos companies have filed for
25
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The dissent also argued that punitive damages awards should be pro-
hibited under local law.' 77 In support of this contention, the dissent
stated the purposes of punitive damages awards, punishment and deter-
rence, have often been adequately met by the assessment of prior punitive
and compensatory awards against defendants.' 78 In addition, the dissent
bankruptcy. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1394 (Weis, J., dissenting) (citing JuIcLIL CONFER-
ENCE AD Hoc Comm. ON ASBESTOS LIrIo., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
reprinted in ASBESTOS LrriG. REP. 22,705 (1991)); see also Albert H. Parnell, Asbestos
Bankruptcies: Are They the Answer?, 1983 BRIEF 5 (discussing financial effect of asbes-
tos litigation); Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbes-
tos Litigation, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541 (1992) (same). Third, multiple
punitive damages awards have increased the likelihood that defendants will no
longer be able to satisfy future compensatory claims. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1395 (Weis,
J., dissenting). The Dunn dissent illustrated this concern with the statement of
Judge William Schwarzer that "[p]unitive damages compete with compensatory
damages for the increasingly scarce resources of asbestos defendants and their in-
surers. Until the claims of future claimants become liquidated, distribution of pu-
nitive damages to current claimants creates a risk of exhausting funds before
potential claimants discover their injuries." Id. at 1398 (Weis, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Asbestos Litigation Crisis in Federal and State Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciay,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 132-33 (1992) (statement of Hon. William W. Schwarzer)).
The Fifth Circuit expressed similar concerns inJackson v.Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., when it stated that "[t]he grave reality of the need to maintain viable enter-
prises to meet future compensation liabilities... commands consideration of the
whole picture." 727 F.2d 506, 524-25 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022
(1986). The court continued:
If the enterprise should fail, early victims would receive compensation but
others whose latency periods were longer would receive no compensation
at all. At the point where awards of punitive damages destroy the viability
of the enterprises necessary to accomplish loss distribution, the remedy of
punitive damages becomes incompatible with the strict liability cause of
action. The later victims, not the enterprise, effectively bear the
punishment.
Id. at 526.
177. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1396-1400 (Weis, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1405 (Weis, J., dissenting). The dissent stated three basic princi-
ples to support this contention. Id. at 1396 (Weis, J., dissenting). First, the pur-
poses of punitive damages, punishment and deterrence, are adequately met
without the imposition of punitive damages. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting). For exam-
ple, the dissent believed that "the avalanche of compensatory claims against asbes-
tos manufacturers has . . .served as more of a punishment and deterrent than
individual punitive assessments in isolated cases against manufacturers of other
types of products." Id. at 1397 (Weis, J., dissenting). Second, punitive damages
provide a windfall to the plaintiff and do not compensate a plaintiff for any injuries
suffered. Id. at 1396 (Weis, J., dissenting). Third, the dissent found "no compel-
ling reason why injured but fully compensated plaintiffs should receive punitive
awards." Id. (Weis, J., dissenting). In support of this third contention, the dissent
noted that the purposes of punitive damages can be adequately served by payment
of such awards to the state. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting); see, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 13-21-102(4) (1989) (stating one-third of all reasonable exemplary damages col-
lected in civil actions are to be paid into state General Fund; although statute was
found unconstitutional in Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo.
1991), to date it has not been repealed); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2) (West Supp.
1130 [Vol. 39: p. 1105
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asserted that the purposes of punitive damages awards cannot be justified
when "they penalize future claimants by depleting available funds."' 79
The dissent alternatively argued that punitive damages awards in mass
tort cases violate the Due Process Clause. 180 Citing the Supreme Court's
decisions in Haslip and TXO, the dissent agreed that certain punitive dam-
ages awards may actually violate substantive and procedural due pro-
cess.18 ' Although the Supreme Court did not hold that the punitive
awards in Haslip and TXO violated substantive or procedural due process,
1994) (stating that in civil actions based on personal injury or wrongful death, 35%
of punitive damages are to be paid into Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund; in
all other civil actions, 35% of punitive damages are to be paid to General Revenue
Fund); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Supp. 1994) (noting that 75% of any
punitive damages award, after payment of attorney's fees and costs, are to be paid
into treasury of state through Fiscal Division of Department of Administrative Serv-
ices; statute was found unconstitutional in McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737
F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990), but to date has not been repealed); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 735, § 5/2-1207110, para. 2-1207 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (stating that trial court
has discretion to determine how much, if any, of punitive damages award is to be
paid to State of Illinois Department of Rehabilitation Services); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 668A.1 (West 1987) (stating that if defendant's conduct is directed specifically at
plaintiff, then full amount of punitive damages is payable to plaintiff; otherwise, at
least 75% of punitive damages award is to be paid into civil reparations trust fund);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (Supp. 1993) (stating that 50% of punitive damages
are to be paid into State's Health Care Stabilization Fund); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.675 (Vernon 1988) (noting that 50% of any punitive damages award, after
payment of attorney's fees and expenses, is to be paid into state Tort Victims' Com-
pensation Fund); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.540 (Supp. 1994) (stating that 50% of all
punitive damages awards, after payment of attorney's fees, is to be paid into Crimi-
nal Injuries Compensation Account); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992) (stat-
ing that 50% of punitive damages in excess of $20,000, after payment of attorney's
fees and costs, are to be paid into state's General Fund).
For a further discussion of the objectives of punitive damages awards, see
supra note 15 and accompanying text.
179. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1400 (Weis, J., dissenting). The dissent expressed ex-
treme concern over protecting future claimants. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting). For this
reason, the dissent urged the Third Circuit to prohibit punitive damages awards in
asbestos cases. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 1400-05 (Weis, J., dissenting). The dissent first stated that the de-
fendant presented sufficient evidence in this case to support a due process claim,
as "[the defendant] listed $19,975,000 awarded against it in punitive damages." Id.
at 1400-01 (Weis, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Due Process Clause, see
supra notes 63-99 and accompanying text.
181. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1401 (Weis, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's holding and reasoning in Haslip, see supra notes 71-86 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's reasoning and holding
in TXO, see supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
The dissent also addressed the constitutional arguments discussed by the
Supreme Court in Halper and Browning-Ferris. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1401-05 (Weis, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's holding and reasoning in
Halpe, see supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's holding and reasoning in Browning-Ferris, see supra notes 54-62
and accompanying text.
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the Court did not foreclose the possibility.18 2 Noting that neither
Supreme Court case dealt with the issue of punitive damages awards in
mass tort cases, the dissent distinguished these two cases from the one at
bar. 1 8
3
Finally, the dissent once again emphasized the unfairness of such
multiple awards in mass tort cases.18 4 For example, the dissent expressed
concern that a future plaintiff will be unable to recover even compensa-
tory damages because repetitive punitive damages awards will often finan-
cially destroy the defendant.18 5 In addition, the dissent noted that the
dual objectives underlying punitive damages awards are adequately accom-
plished with multiple awards of compensatory damages.18 6
The dissent then applied these articulated principles to the facts in
Dunn.18 7 In doing so, the dissent found that multiple compensatory
awards against the defendant sufficiently satisfied the purposes of punitive
damages awards.18 8 The dissent also observed that ensuing asbestos litiga-
tion would have resulted in the defendant's bankruptcy, had the company
not been diversified.18 9 Persuaded by the significance of these principles,
the dissent concluded that the award in Dunn should have been struck
down.' 9 0
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's broad application of the procedural and sub
stantive due process requirements seems to preclude further due process
challenges against the imposition of punitive damages awards.' 9 ' Some
commentators believe, however, that the Court's holding in Haslip was suf-
ficiently fact-specific to allow subsequent defendants to argue that such
damage awards violate due process. 192
Although the chances of success in a procedural due process chal-
lenge against punitive damages awards appear grim in the Third Circuit
182. For a discussion of Haslip, see supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of TXO, see supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
183. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1401 (Weis, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 1401-05 (Weis, J., dissenting).
185. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 1401-05 (Weis, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the objectives of
punitive damages, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
187. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1405 (Weis, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting).
190. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting).
191. For a discussion of Supreme Court's holding in Haslip, see supra notes
71-86 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., May, supra note 27, at 579 ("Haslip... is fact-specific .. .[and]
does not completely foreclose future due process challenges to excessive awards of
punitive damages.").
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after Dunn,193 a constitutional attack may be successful if a jury is given
unfettered discretion in awarding punitive damages or if no review proce-
dures exist for assessing the reasonableness of the award. 194 Moreover,
although specifically refusing to hold that repetitive or excessive punitive
damages awards are per se violations of substantive due process, the Third
Circuit did not foreclose the possibility that a particular punitive damages
award might violate constitutional safeguards.1 95 The probability that a
punitive damages award will be struck down on these grounds is slight,
however, because the Supreme Court's decision in TXO seems to bar sub-
stantive due process challenges. 196 Thus, it appears that a defendant's
due process challenge in the Third Circuit will only prevail if the court can
be persuaded that such multiple awards no longer serve the dual purposes
of punitive damages.1 9 7
Barbara J. Shander
193. See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1386 ("[N]o majority opinion from any court ...
holds that multiple punitive damages claims must be struck down [under the Due
Process Clause].").
194. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1991) (outlin-
ing requirements of due process). Given the likelihood of a court employing this
method of awarding punitive damages, Dunn has effectively precluded the success
of future procedural due process challenges. Riggs, supra note 50, at 866 n.30 ("If
[the] jury instructions [in Haslip] were adequate it is hard to imagine any extant
jury instructions that would fail."). For a discussion of the majority opinion in
Dunn, see supra notes 145-72 and accompanying text.
195. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1389. The court did note, however, that a defendant
must present sufficient evidence as to the amount of punitive damages that have
been paid in the past. Id. The court found no evidence presented in Dunn which
demonstrated the amount of punitive damages assessed against the defendant in
the past. Id.
196. See The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 107 HARv. L. REv. 144, 194 (1993)
("The Court's refusal to 'shut the door' on a subjective reasonableness inquiry may
have effectively galvanized efforts at legislative reform of punitive awards."). If the
Court found a punitive damages award 526 times that of the compensatory award
constitutional, it is unlikely that any award will be found excessive. See TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2720-21 (1993) (upholding
award of punitive damages that was 526 times the compensatory award). For a
further discussion of the Court's decision in TXO, see supra notes 87-93 and ac-
companying text.
197. See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1393-1405 (Weis, J., dissenting) (arguing multiple
punitive damages awards do not serve as punishment and deterrence). Defend-
ants must make the appropriate evidentiary showing before the Third Circuit will
even consider the due process claims. Id. at 1389.
1994] 1133*
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